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DISCRETIONARY DEATH PENALTY FOR CONVICTED 
DRUG COURIERS IN SINGAPORE: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HIGH COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
THUS FAR*1
Chen Siyuan**2
ABSTRACT
For decades, drug trafficking was a serious offence in Singapore 
potentially punishable by mandatory death. In 2012, Singapore’s 
Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) was amended to give the courts 
sentencing discretion if the accused can first prove that he was 
merely a courier, and to better reflect the moral culpability accorded 
as between mules and kingpins in the hierarchy of drug syndicates. 
However, there are some complications in proving this. Not only must 
the accused show that he was merely a courier, he must also show 
that he had substantively assisted the authorities in disrupting drug-
trafficking activities in Singapore. This raises an evidential quagmire 
as it is for the prosecution to certify that such assistance had indeed 
been rendered – the accused is therefore incentivised to admit to some 
form of guilt from the outset rather than to remain silent, since he may 
be precluded from adducing evidence of his role as a courier once the 
judge is satisfied that a drug-trafficking charge has been made out. 
Questions of self-incrimination and presumption of innocence are 
thus engaged. In addition, it is questionable if prosecutorial discretion 
should be further fortified by placing the certification power in the 
hands of the prosecutor. Finally, the MDA only states the preconditions 
of when there may be a discretionary death penalty, but does not state 
under what circumstances it should be preferred. Part 1 of this article 
establishes the background to Singapore’s historical approach towards 
drug-trafficking. Part 2 provides a synopsis of the first major High 
Court decision that addressed the amended MDA provision, while 
Part 3 analyses the decision as well as related case law. Concluding 
observations reside in Part 4.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on 
Law, Order, and Criminal Justice 2014, which in turn was based on my case comment 
in Chen Siyuan, “Singapore’s New Discretionary Death Penalty for Drug Couriers: 
Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan,” International Journal of Evidence & Proof 18(3) 
(2004):260. Comments from the conference audience have been gratefully adopted. I 
thank my Research Assistant Jason Lim (JD, SMU) for his help in updating the paper, 
though of course all errors remain mine.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.
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BUDI BICARA HUKUMAN MATI TERHADAP PEMBAWA 
DADAH YANG DISABITKAN DI SINGAPURA: RENUNGAN 
TERHADAP PERUNDANGAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI 
SETAKAT INI
ABSTRAK
Buat sekian lama, pengedaran dadah merupakan jenayah yang serius 
di Singapura dan ianya boleh dikenakan hukuman mati mandatori.  
Pada tahun 2012, Singapura telah meminda Akta Penyalahgunaan 
Dadah. Pindaan ini telah memberikan Mahkamah Tinggi kuasa untuk 
memilih hukuman yang wajar diberikan kepada pesalah yang hanya 
menjadi keldai dadah. Walaubagaimanapun, Kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi 
ini hanya boleh dilaksanakan jika tertuduh berjaya membuktikan 
pembabitannya dalam jenayah tersebut hanyalah sebagai pembawa 
dadah. Walaubagaimanapun beban pembuktian adalah agak tinggi 
dan sukar dipenuhi pihak tertuduh. Ini kerana dia juga terpaksa 
menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh juga turut membantu pihak berkuasa 
dalam usaha membenteras jenayah tersebut di Singapura. Ini 
membebankan tertuduh kerana sepatutnya beban pembuktian ini 
perlu dipenuhi oleh pihak pendakwaan bagi memenuhi kehendak 
pindaan ini,  tertuduh seolah-olah digalakkan mengaku salah  bagi 
membolehkannya  mengguna pakai pengecualian tersebut. Tertuduh 
juga seolah-olah di nafikan hak untuk berdiam diri. Ini menimbulkan 
permasalahan tertuduh memburukkan diri sendiri dan ini menyalahi 
kaedah seorang itu dianggap tidak bersalah hingga terbukti demikian.
Selain itu pindaan tersebut juga tidak memberi panduan jelas tentang  
keadaan yang membolehkan pihak Mahkamah membuat pilihan 
tersebut. Oleh itu, Bahagian 1 makalah ini akan membincangkan 
latar belakang terhadap pengedaran dadah di Singapura. Bahagian 2 
pula memberikan sinopsis kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang 
pertama setelah pindaan yang dilakukan terhadap Akta Penyalahgunaan 
Dadah 2012. Sementara itu Bahagian 3 pula melihat senarai kes-kes 
yang berkaitan. Bahagian 4 akhirnya merumuskan pengamatan yang 
telah diberikan.
Kata kunci: Akta Penyalahgunaan Dadah, kaedah seorang itu dianggap tidak 
bersalah hingga terbukti demikian, budi bicara hukuman mati, 
pembawa dadah, kaedah-kaedah menjatuhkan hukuman
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BACKGROUND: THE CHANGE IN THE LAW FOR DRUG 
COURIERS
The Singapore government has long adopted an uncompromising 
stance against drug trafficking in the laws it has enacted. Very severe 
punishments – ranging from caning and long-term imprisonment to the 
death penalty – have been justified by the government on communitarian 
policy grounds that drug addiction has the clear potential to upset the 
fabric of society, break up families, and cause addicts to turn towards a 
cycle of violent crime to feed their addiction.1 These punishments are 
coupled with a series of presumptions built into the Misuse of Drugs 
Act (MDA),2 designed to disrupt the efforts of drug syndicates from 
around the region – perhaps the worst hotbed for illegal drug activities 
in the world3 – from smuggling their merchandise into Singapore. 
For example, pursuant to section 18 of the MDA, any person 
who is found with controlled drugs is presumed to have had those 
drugs in his possession and also presumed to have known the nature 
of those drugs.4 Further, under section 17, if the controlled drugs in 
question exceed a certain quantity, there is a presumption that it is for 
the purpose of trafficking. Currently, in order to successfully rebut 
these presumptions, the requisite standard of proof is on a balance of 
probabilities instead of having to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, it makes it harder for the accused drug trafficker to secure 
an acquittal. The Singapore courts have long held that this is an entirely 
 
1 See Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, 12 November 2012.
2 Misuse of Drugs Act (Chapter 185, Revised Edition 2008). The MDA finds 
equivalents to varying degrees in other jurisdictions such as Malaysia and Hong Kong 
(see Abdul Rani Kamarudin, “The Misuse of Drugs in Malaysia: Past and Present,” 
Jurnal Antidadah Malaysia 1, no. 1 (June 2007): 9–19. This discussion of the new 
MDA provisions may thus be of interest to such jurisdictions. Singapore shares similar 
legislation on both criminal and evidence law with Malaysia as well.
3 “Strong Growth in Myanmar Boosts Opium Production in ‘Golden 
Triangle’ – UN Report, “United Nations, accessed  December 1, 2014, http://
www.un.org/apps/news/s tory.asp?NewsID=46773&Cr=opium&Cr1=#.
U970WWOupEI For instance, according to the United Nations, Myanmar – which 
is part of the Golden Triangle – is the second largest producer of opium in the world. 
4  For a commentary on this, see Chen Siyuan and Nathaniel Khng, “Possession and 
Knowledge in the Misuse of Drugs Act,” Singapore Law Review 30 (2012): 181.
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legitimate interest that Parliament can pursue.5 A successful conviction 
for drug trafficking could, depending on the quantity trafficked as set 
out in the charge, lead to the mandatory death penalty.6
Human rights and constitutional challenges have thus been 
mounted against the legality of the MDA (including its provisions on 
the mandatory death penalty) over the years, but none of them have ever 
succeeded before the Singapore courts.7 The Singapore government’s 
position over the years has largely been consistent, in that the death 
penalty serves as the best deterrent against drug trafficking, which it 
considers to be one of the gravest and most serious crimes possible.8 
In his 2014 speech at the 69th Session of the United Nations General 
5  Tan Kiam Peng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1, [54]–[61]; Nagaenthran 
a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 1156, [27]–[31]; Dinesh 
Pillai a/l K Raja Retnam v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 903, [18]; Muhammad 
Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 721, [75]. In a sense, this is not 
anomalous, given that section 107 of the Evidence Act (Chapter 97, Revised Edition 
1997) states that “When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving 
the existence of circumstances bringing the case … within any special exception or 
proviso contained in … any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the court shall 
presume the absence of such circumstances”. Further, section 108 states that “When 
any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that 
fact is upon him.” These provisions, however, have been claimed to contradict common 
notions of the right to a presumption of innocence and may even be unconstitutional 
under Singapore law: Michael Hor, “The Presumption of Innocence – A Constitutional 
Discourse for Singapore,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (1995):369–371. See 
also Public Prosecutor v Kum Chee Cheong [1993] 3 SLR(R) 737, [39].
6  See MDA, sections 5, 7, 33, and Second Schedule. 
7  See generally Chen Siyuan, “A Preliminary Survey of the Right to Presumption of 
Innocence in Singapore,” LAWASIA Journal 7 (2012): 78; Chen Siyuan, “The Limits on 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: Past, Present, and Future,” International Review 
of Law, no. 1 (2013): 1. Certain international organisations also make the sensationalist 
claim that Singapore has the highest rate of executions in the world, though it is true that 
an overwhelming percentage of drug trafficking prosecutions in Singapore do result 
in convictions. For a survey on the related discussion of whether there are wrongful 
convictions in Singapore, see Chen Siyuan and Eunice Chua, “Wrongful Convictions 
in Singapore: A General Survey of Risk Factors,” Singapore Law Review 28 (2010):98, 
wherein the authors conclude that the rate of such convictions in Singapore is almost 
negligible. For a discussion on how a mandatory death penalty regime may be illegal 
under international law standards, see Michael Hor, “The Death Penalty in Singapore 
and International Law,” Singapore Yearbook of International Law 8 (2004): 105. 
8 The Singapore government considers drug trafficking to be so serious an offence 
that it occasionally resorts to the detention without trial of certain traffickers. One of 
the statutes that permit this is the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Chapter 
67, Revised Edition 1985), which was originally enacted in 1955 and was expected to 
be repealed after stability in then crime-ridden Singapore was established. 
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Assembly, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for 
Law reiterated that, “Drug traffickers impose immense penalties, 
including the death penalty, on their victims … We want to protect our 
people from becoming victims, and to protect our society.”9 The death 
penalty therefore looks likely to remain in Singapore’s statute books 
for the foreseeable future.
Nonetheless, perhaps in a bid to “draw a very careful, calibrated 
distinction between the different levels of accountability,” between 
kingpins and mules in drug syndicates, and to “temper and mitigate 
the harsh drug laws with compassion”, the MDA was amended in 
2012.10 One of the most significant changes was the introduction of 
section 33B, which gives any judge hearing a capital drug trafficking 
case the discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment11 and 
caning instead of the death penalty for low-level drug operatives if two 
But even as late as 2013, the life of the provision was extended for the umpteenth 
time, complete with approval from the opposition party in Parliament: Second Reading 
of Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, 11 November 2013. See also Second Reading of Corruption, Drug Trafficking 
and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) (Amendment) Bill, Singapore 
Parliament Reports, 7 July 2014 for the latest parliamentary affirmation on the war 
on drugs. 
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Singapore), Transcript of Statement by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law K Shanmugam at the High-Level Side Event 
at the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, “Moving Away from the 
Death Penalty: National Leadership”, accessed  December 1,2014,
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2014/201409/
press_201409261.html.
10  Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Edwin Tong). One of 
the recurring criticisms by opponents to the mandatory death penalty is that more often 
than not, the traffickers arrested are “mules” who are usually in desperate need for 
money rather than the masterminds or kingpins of well-organised drug syndicates. 
The somewhat controversial Court of Appeal decisions in Nguyen Tuong Van v Public 
Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 and Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 
SLR 489 are often cited as examples by such detractors, though in the latter case, 
the accused’s death sentence was eventually commuted to imprisonment and caning 
pursuant to the amended MDA.
11  For a commentary on the meaning of “life imprisonment”, see Chen Siyuan, 
“The Meaning of ‘Life Imprisonment’ in the Context of a Presidential Commutation 
Order,” Singapore Law Watch Commentaries 3 (2012). It should also be noted that 
this set of discretionary measures were simultaneously introduced with a similar 
set for murder offences under the Penal Code (Chapter 224, Revised Edition 2008). 
For an overview of both, see Mohammad Faizal and Wong Woon Kwong, “Changes 
to the Mandatory Death Penalty Regime – An Overview of the Changes and Some 
Preliminary Reflections,” Singapore Law Gazette, (September 2013) http://www.
lawgazette.com.sg/2013-09/842.htm, accessed  December 1, 2014.
36 IIUM LAW JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1. 2015
conjunctive conditions are met.12
First, the accused must prove, on a balance of probabilities, 
that his role in the offence (of drug trafficking) was restricted to that 
of a courier within his drug syndicate;13 and secondly, the prosecution 
must certify that the accused had substantively assisted the Central 
Narcotics Bureau (CNB) in disrupting drug trafficking activities within 
or outside Singapore. That is the gist of this new provision. There is no 
indication in the relevant records that the provision was inspired by any 
particular jurisdiction. The relevant parts of section 33B reads:14
33B.—(1) Where a person commits or attempts to commit 
[trafficking in controlled drugs and importing and exporting 
controlled drugs], being an offence punishable with death … 
and he is convicted thereof, the court —
(a) may, if the person satisfies the requirements of 
subsection (2), instead of imposing the death 
penalty, sentence the person to imprisonment 
for life and, if the person is sentenced to life 
imprisonment, he shall also be sentenced to 
caning of not less than 15 strokes …
12  Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Teo Chee Hean). In 
Singapore, pursuant to section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Chapter 1, Revised Edition 
2002), it is necessary to refer to parliamentary reports as a first port-of-call when 
interpreting statutory provisions. “In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, 
an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law 
(whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be 
preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object.”
13  Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Teo Chee Hean). 
“Courier” is not a term that is actually used in the MDA; instead, as can be seen, the 
key words used in section 33B are “transporting, sending or delivering” controlled 
drugs. It was also clarified in Parliament that the narrow scope of section 33B would 
not extend to accused persons who have packed or stored the drugs. 
14  Alternatively, it is open to the accused (under subsection 3 which is not 
reproduced here) to prove, also on a balance of probabilities, that he was suffering 
from an abnormality of mind to the extent that it substantially impaired his mental 
responsibility for his acts and omissions in relation to the trafficking or import and 
export of controlled drugs. This is known as the defence of diminished responsibility, 
which under the Penal Code is a specific defence to culpable homicide. However, the 
discussion on diminished responsibility is rather distinct and falls outside the scope of 
the present endeavour. 
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(2)  The requirements referred to in subsection (1)(a)are as 
follows:
(a) the person convicted proves, on a balance 
of probabilities, that his involvement in the 
offence … was restricted —
i. to transporting, sending or delivering 
a controlled drug;
ii. to offering to transport, send or deliver 
a controlled drug; 
iii. to doing or offering to do any act 
preparatory to or for the purpose of 
his transporting, sending or delivering 
a controlled drug; or
iv. to any combination of activities in 
sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii); and
(b) the Public Prosecutor certifies to any court 
that, in his determination, the person has 
substantively assisted the Central Narcotics 
Bureau in disrupting drug trafficking activities 
within or outside Singapore.
[…]
(4)  The determination of whether or not any person has 
substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting 
drug trafficking activities shall be at the sole discretion of the 
Public Prosecutor and no action or proceeding shall lie against 
the Public Prosecutor in relation to any such determination 
unless it is proved to the court that the determination was done 
in bad faith or with malice.
Before the 2012 amendments to the MDA, an accused facing a drug 
trafficking charge was already in an unenviable position in terms of 
how likely he is able to successfully prove his innocence. But did the 
amendments make matters even more difficult, despite initial perceptions 
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that  the amendment was meant to be more compassionate?15 The High 
Court in Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan (Chum Tat Suan (High 
Court))16 certainly thought so, but nevertheless proceeded to conclude 
that the accused person was indeed a courier for the purpose of section 
33B. 
Proceedings, however, came to a standstill as the Attorney-
General’s Chambers immediately filed a Criminal Reference17 to the 
Court of Appeal (the apex court in Singapore), seeking clarification 
and guidance on some of the comments made by the judge in Chum 
Tat Suan (High Court). There was thus a stay on the sentence pending 
the Court of Appeal’s decision. Unfortunately, at the completion of this 
article, the Court of Appeal had yet to render its decision. This article 
will thus focus on the High Court decision (which was the first major 
decision to comment on the amended provisions of the MDA) as well 
as related case law from the same court. Specifically, the focus will be 
on some of the main evidential and sentencing issues that arise.
15  See for instance Hor, “The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law”. 
To be clear, the discretionary death penalty is not entirely new to Singapore’s criminal 
justice system. Kidnapping, for instance, is an offence that can either result in life 
imprisonment and caning or the death penalty: Chandra Mohan and Priscilla Chia, 
“The Death Penalty and the Desirability of Judicial Discretion,” Singapore Law 
Gazette (March 2013), accessed December 1, 2014http://www.lawgazette.com.
sg/2013-03/697.htm.
16  Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2014] 1 SLR 336 (High Court). The High 
Court is the second-highest court in Singapore, after the Court of Appeal. It should be 
noted that the judge who heard this case also heard Public Prosecutor v Abdul Kahar 
bin Othman [2013] SGHC 222, which also dealt in part with the same issues (the 
details of which need not detain us). The two judgments were released on the same day. 
Notably, Chum Tat Suan (High Court) was only the second case to have considered and 
applied section 33B of the MDA. The first was Public Prosecutor v Abdul Haleem bin 
Abdul Karim [2013] 3 SLR 734, where the court made certain important observations 
as to how the role of a drug courier should be interpreted under section 33B. One of the 
appeals that arose from the decision has since been decided (see Muhammad Ridzuan 
bin Md Ali), but this appeal did not concern issues relating to section 33B. 
17  This was probably done pursuant to Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Chapter 
322, Revised Edition 2014), section 59. A Criminal Reference ought to be distinguished 
from a Criminal Motion. In the former, questions of law that are of public interest are 
presented to the Court of Appeal – for instance where the High Court has already 
exercised its appellate jurisdiction and there is no further right to appeal to the Court 
of Appeal. Whether or not leave is granted for a Criminal Reference to be filed will be 
considered in a Criminal Motion, though other types of orders may also be sought in a 
Criminal Motion, such as extensions of time or adductions of further evidence. For a 
representative case, see James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] SGCA 
33. 
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DECISION IN CHUM TAT SUAN (HIGH COURT)
The key facts of  the case was in relation to the accused, now almost 
70 years old,18 who was charged with importing 94.96 grams of 
diamorphine into Singapore some time in 2010. This amount was 
considerably higher than the 15 gram threshold that triggered a potential 
death penalty sentence.19 His main defence was that the bag (which 
contained the drugs) found in the boot of the taxi he was in was not his. 
He also insisted that in any case, he did not know what was in the bag. 
Justice Choo Han Teck did not believe this defence and convicted 
him, and consequently section 33B of the MDA was engaged. As this 
was a new area of the law, Justice Choo sought further submissions 
for a separate hearing on sentencing, and the parties returned with a 
jointly agreed proposal.20According to that proposal, the judge must 
first determine the preliminary question of whether the accused was 
indeed a courier; if the answer was no, then the mandatory death penalty 
ensues. If the answer was yes, the prosecution would – presumably 
after seeking an adjournment of the hearing – record a statement from 
the accused so that it can decide whether to certify that the accused 
had substantively assisted CNB in disrupting drug trafficking activities 
within or outside Singapore. If the prosecution so certifies, the judge 
would then decide if the death penalty or life imprisonment and caning 
is the more appropriate punishment.21
Justice Choo, however, described this multi-step proposal as giving 
rise to a “significant difficulty”.22 He elaborated on his position in the 
following terms:
I have already convicted the accused on the basis of findings of fact 
that I have made. But now I have to make new findings on at least one 
18  See Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2013] SGHC 150. Singapore law 
only prohibits the death penalty being passed on persons below 18 years (at the time 
the offence was committed) and pregnant women: Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) 
(Chapter 68, Revised Edition 2012), sections 314 and 315. 
19  See MDA, Second Schedule read with section 33B.
20  Chum Tat Suan (High Court), [4].
21  An additional step was actually proposed: if the prosecution declines to certify, 
both parties would make submissions on whether the accused nonetheless was suffering 
from an abnormality of mind at the material time, assuming that such a defence was 
raised. In this regard the Court of Appeal had recently pronounced that the trial judge 
has a duty to consider alternative defences that might reasonably be made out: Public 
Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2012] 3 SLR 527, [63]–[80].
22  Chum Tat Suan (High Court), [5].
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question of fact for the purposes of sentencing, which is whether the 
accused was no more than a “courier”. If I allow parties to introduce 
new evidence … there is the possibility of evidence emerging that 
might undermine the findings of facts that I had earlier made in 
convicting the accused. There is even the possibility of evidence 
emerging that casts doubt on the guilt of the accused. On the other 
hand, if I do not allow the introduction of any new evidence, and 
premise my decision on sentencing exclusively on the findings of 
fact that I have already made and the evidence that had been adduced 
at trial, there is a possibility of prejudice to the accused, in that he 
might have conducted his defence in such a manner as to furnish 
no occasion for evidence of his being no more than a “courier” to 
emerge at trial. This would make it difficult or impossible for him 
now to prove, without introducing further evidence on the question, 
that he was no more than a “courier”. I think this difficulty is not 
confined to the present case but is one which may afflict all cases in 
which the accused faces a capital charge under the MDA.23
Justice Choo further noted that the alternative approaches to either 
decide issues of conviction and sentence together or to have the 
sentencing submissions based only on the evidence adduced at trial 
would only serve to put the accused “in a bind”:
[I]n order to make the claim that he was no more than a “courier”, 
the accused must first admit that he was trafficking or importing 
or exporting drugs. Choosing not to admit this might subsequently 
preclude him from arguing that he was no more than a “courier” 
should the court convict him nonetheless. For instance, if the accused 
elects to remain silent because he is of the opinion that the prosecution 
has not made out a case against him, and the court convicts him 
anyway, he would not have had the opportunity to give evidence for 
the purposes of proving that he was no more than a “courier”. If his 
case was that he did not know that he had drugs in his possession, or 
that he had them in his possession for his own personal consumption, 
the evidence he gives and adduces at trial would be directed towards 
proving that case rather than that he was no more than a “courier”. 
Consequently, should the court disbelieve his defence and convict 
him, it would be difficult or impossible for him to argue that he was 
no more than a “courier”. One response might be that the accused 
must take a position and stick with it. But the onus is not on the 
accused to take positions. Since the Prosecution seeks to invoke the 
court’s authority to punish the accused, the onus is on the Prosecution 
to prove its case as to why the accused should be so punished. This 
must especially be so when the punishment sought to be visited on 
23 Ibid.
Discretionary Death Penalty in Singapore 41
 
the accused is the sentence of death.24
Justice Choo eventually held that on the basis of the evidence presented 
at the trial that led to the accused’s conviction, the accused was no more 
than a courier.25In the analysis that follows, three issues will be analysed: 
first, whether an accused’s privilege against self-incrimination and right 
to presumption of innocence is infringed upon, even if unintended, by 
the new MDA provisions; secondly, whether the prosecutor is the best 
party to certify substantive assistance; and thirdly, whether sentencing 
guidelines would be desirable in this context.
ANALYSIS OF CHUM TAT SUAN (HIGH COURT)
Privilege against self-incrimination and right to presumption of 
innocence
Without being explicit in his judgment, Justice Choo must have 
been referring  mainly to the privilege against self-incrimination 
and concomitantly, the right to  the presumption of innocence.26 
In his analysis, an accused drug courier can probably avail himself 
of section 33B of the MDA only if he had in some way confessed to 
liability before or during the trial. Otherwise, how else can he satisfy 
the first requirement of being just a courier in the drug syndicate? One 
need only consider that the usual defences27 raised by persons accused 
of drug trafficking would be to either deny knowledge of the existence 
of the drugs that are found on them or their belongings, or to deny 
knowledge of the contents of what they were told to traffic. These were 
the defences raised in Chum Tat Suan (High Court); this also explains 
24 Ibid, 6.
25 Ibid, 7. 
26 On the connection between the two, see Michael Menlowe, “Bentham, Self-
Incrimination and the Law of Evidence,” Law Quarterly Review 104(2) (1998): 303–
306; Andrew Ashworth, “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence,” International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof Vol.10, No.4 (2006): 255–256. 
27  Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Farid bin Mohd Yusop [2014] SGHC 125. In 
this case, which involved the invocation of an unusual defence, the accused was found 
trafficking almost 400 grams of methamphetamine, an offence punishable by death. 
However, he succeeded in arguing that though he knew what he was carrying, his 
arrangement with his superior was that per previous arrangements, he would only 
traffic less than 250 grams, an amount that would not trigger the death penalty. He 
succeeded in his defence and the charge was amended accordingly.
42 IIUM LAW JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1. 2015
why the aforementioned presumptions in section 18 of the MDA exist. 
It is also possible for an accused to remain silent, but under section 
261 of the CPC,28 if he raises a defence at trial that was not brought up 
when he was charged, adverse inferences may be drawn with regards 
to is guilt.29 There is only disadvantage to be gained if one keeps silent. 
With all of the above in mind, if an accused drug courier wants to 
maximise his chances of escaping the gallows, he essentially has two 
options,  both of which is wrought with some serious difficulty. On the 
one hand, if he is caught with a huge quantity of drugs and a conviction 
upon the likely charge may result in the death penalty, short of him 
having truly plausible defences against the statutory presumptions 
against him, he will probably want to admit that he is part of a drug 
syndicate before he is convicted and hope he is found to have rendered 
substantive assistance to the CNB so that section 33B of the MDA can 
be successfully invoked. On the other hand, if he is unsure that the 
likely charge may result in the death penalty, he may try to strike some 
kind of bargain with the prosecution beforehand that the quantity of 
drugs he is charged with trafficking does not trigger the death penalty 
– but this presupposes this can even be done, as current prosecutorial 
practices do not seem to allow such bargains to be made for drug 
trafficking cases.30 At any rate, for both options, he is required to plead 
guilty at some point (but he would want to do so sooner rather than 
28  See also CPC, section 22; Kwek Seow Hock v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 
157, [18]–[19].
29 The adverse inferences can also be used to determine whether to commit the 
accused for trial or whether there is a case to answer. However, they cannot be used 
to bolster an otherwise evidentially weak case: Took Leng How v Public Prosecutor 
[2006] 2 SLR(R) 70, [43]. A fortiori, adverse inferences per se also cannot be used to 
secure a conviction. See also CPC, section 23(1), which has a template warning to be 
read to the accused when his cautioned statement is being recorded: “Do you want to 
say anything about the charge that was just read to you? If you keep quiet now about 
any fact or matter in your defence and you reveal this fact or matter in your defence 
only at your trial, the judge may be less likely to believe you. This may have a bad 
effect on your case in court. Therefore it may be better for you to mention such fact or 
matter now. If you wish to do so, what you say will be written down, read back to you 
for any mistakes to be corrected and then signed by you.” It should be noted that there 
is also another provision in the CPC that address adverse inferences; section 230(1) 
states that if an accused elects not to give evidence in court after the prosecution has 
made out a case, adverse inferences may be drawn as regards his guilt.
30  At least in relation to the MDA context. For other crimes, though not formalised 
in legislation, de facto plea bargains are often struck in pre-trial proceedings such as 
the Criminal Case Resolution. To be clear, the weight of pleas in Singapore is not as 
strong in jurisdictions such as the US, but nor are they devoid of some weight.
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later), while the prosecution holds all of the cards. Are there certain 
compelling features of the offence of drug trafficking that justify this 
asymmetry?
A Member of Parliament had raised this concern when the 2012 
amendments to the MDA were being debated in Parliament. He 
questioned the fairness of the amendment when  the accused drug 
couriers had  to “be pressurised into incriminating themselves” in 
the calculated hope of avoiding the death penalty.31 In response, the 
Minister for Law said quite candidly: “if the accused knows something, 
and has to decide between trying to run a false defence that he knows 
nothing, and telling the truth and assisting the CNB – I do not think 
Members will argue against giving him an incentive to tell the truth, 
to help us, and to help himself.”32 This response, it may be said, is 
generally consonant with Singapore’s longstanding subscription 
to the “crime control” model of criminal justice, which prioritises 
successful convictions over procedural rights in contradistinction to 
the “due process” model.33 It can also be said to be consistent with the 
criminal justice philosophy espoused by the courts over the years.34 
For instance, the Court of Appeal has ruled that the right to silence 
31 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, 12 November 2012 (Eugene Tan).
32 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, 14 November 2012 (Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam). In a speech in 2014, the 
Minister said that Singapore’s “criminal justice system is anchored on four fundamental 
principles: our laws and the criminal process must protect society and uphold law and 
order … due process and the rule of law must be observed, and sentences must be 
commensurate with the culpability of the offender and the seriousness of the offence … 
our law enforcement agencies must be empowered to discharge their duties. And law 
enforcement should not be seen as a ‘catch me if you can’, or jumping through a series 
of technical hurdles … where possible, offenders must be given the opportunity to be 
rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. We run one of the world’s best programmes 
and that aspect hasn’t received much attention”: Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore), 
“Keynote Address by Law Minister K Shanmugam at NUS-SMU Criminal Justice 
Conference”, accessed  December 1, 2014 https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/
en/news/speeches/minister-keynote-nus-smu-criminal-justice-conference.html.
33 See generally Chan Sek Keong, “The Criminal Process – The Singapore Model,” 
Singapore Law Review 17 (1996): 433; Melanie Chng, “Modernising the Criminal 
Justice Framework: The Criminal Procedure Code 2010,” Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal, Vol.23 No.1 (2010): 23. In the latter article, the author essentially makes the 
argument that crime control and the seemingly antithetical ideal of due process are not 
always conflicting with each other on opposite ends of the scale.
34 For an opposing view (and more modern survey of the jurisprudence), see Chen, 
“The Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore,” 15–18.
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(which overarches the privilege against self-incrimination)35 is neither 
a rule of natural justice nor a constitutional right,36 while the High 
Court has ruled that the right to silence is an impediment to an accused 
establishing whatever defence he has in a timely manner.37
In perspective, however, the right to silence has largely been 
modified or abrogated in other jurisdictions as well.  A commentator 
describes the right as only being “theoretically intact” in England.38 
Be that as it may, the fact that an accused drug courier now has an 
additional disincentive to remain silent is, at the very least, another step 
away from his basic right to a presumption of innocence.39 Moreover, it 
cannot be ignored that jurisdictions that have abolished or come close 
to abolishing the right to silence do not have laws carrying the death 
penalty.40 Therefore, in the context of drug trafficking offences, there 
is a serious need to reflect upon the implications when the presumption 
of innocence is lessened. To what extent can communitarian interests, 
manifested in parliamentary will, be used to advance the ideals of crime 
control where it is literally a matter of life and death?
35 Adrian Keane and Paul McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (Oxford 
University Press: 2012), 409.
36 Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968, [15]–[19]. See 
also Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, [26]–[29]. On the 
importance of having a constitutional basis to protect an accused’s rights, see Johannes 
Chan, “Constitutional Protection of the Right to be Presumed Innocent and the Right 
against Self-Incrimination,” Singapore Academy of Law Journal 25(2) (2013): 679.
37 Yap Giau Beng Terence v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 855, [38].
38 Keane and McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence, 595.
39 “Escaping the Gallows – Drug Mules, Death Penalties and Discretion,” 
Innocence Project Singapore, accessed December 1, 2014. http://sginnocenceproject.
com/2013/12/26/escaping-the-gallows-drug-mules-death-penalties-and-discretion/:“It 
is the information that a drug courier possesses rather than his culpability that 
exonerates him. This is … a policy that can lead to unfair judicial outcomes. A 
drug courier who willingly volunteers to smuggle drugs into Singapore would 
be spared the death penalty if he has the information which can substantially 
assist the CNB. Conversely, a drug courier who was forced to smuggle drugs, and 
thus of lesser culpability, would not be spared from the gallows if he possesses no 
information that lends substantive assistance … the requirement of substantial 
assistance goes little way towards proportionality and nuance … it is expressly 
skewed in favour of deterrence, arguably at the expense of fairer sentencing.”
40 Amnesty International claims that more than two-thirds of the countries in the 
world have abolished the death penalty in law or practice: Amnesty International, 
“Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,” accessed  December 1,2014, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries.
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Prosecutor’s role in the certification of substantive assistance
Aside from the above, there is also the matter of extending prosecutorial 
discretion that was not directly addressed by Justice Choo in his 
judgment. Quite apart from the problem of having the prosecution 
certify substantive assistance only after the conviction, there is the prior 
question of whether it should even be the prosecution that does this 
certification.41 While it is true that a sub-section in section 33B of the 
MDA allows the certification decision to be challenged on the grounds 
of bad faith or malice, recent case law (albeit in the constitutional law 
context) has confirmed that any challenge of prosecutorial discretion 
involves a few hurdles.42
First, there is always a strong presumption that the prosecution has 
exercised prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the law, given the 
high office the Attorney-General who assumes as a constitutional equal 
to the judiciary. Secondly, the burden is on the accused to adduce (prima 
facie) evidence of any improper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Thirdly, even if the prosecution had exercised discretion improperly, 
the court can only make a declaration to that effect, but it has no power 
to do anything else, such as ordering a retrial or granting an acquittal.43 
In this regard, there is no precedent in which prosecutorial discretion 
has successfully been challenged, and section 33B of the MDA is also 
silent as to the consequence of successfully challenging the certification 
decision.
Not only that, even if one decides to challenge the certification, this 
only protracts legal proceedings, which is often only to the detriment of 
41 A presupposition here is that the certification issue only arises when a prosecution 
is brought – in other words, the prosecution cannot promise substantive assistance 
before the prosecution as some kind of plea bargain. This has to be the case or the 
purpose of introducing section 33B of the MDA would be completely defeated, not to 
mention an arrogation of the court’s (legal) function to determine whether the accused 
is a courier. 
42 See Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49, [24]–[45]; 
Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872, [18]–[39]; Quek Hock Lye v 
Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012, [22]–[29].
43 Interestingly, however, the High Court and Court of Appeal have in previous 
cases exercised their judicial powers to liberate an accused when the circumstances 
are extreme: see for instance Yunani bin Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [2008] 
3 SLR(R) 383, [63]–[68]; AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34, [306]–[315]. 
For a related and brief discourse on a court’s inherent powers, see Chen Siyuan, “Is 
the Invocation of Inherent Jurisdiction the same as the Exercise of Inherent Powers,” 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 17(4) (2013): 367.
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the accused, especially one on death row.44 Thus, in light of the sheer 
number of procedural hurdles and possible irreparable prejudice to the 
accused, some may take the view that it should be the court, and not 
the prosecutor that should decide if the courier had indeed rendered 
substantive assistance to the CNB. Alternatively, the threshold for 
certification should be lowered – for instance, to that of good faith 
cooperation.45 However, the Minister for Law rejected both possibilities 
during the parliamentary debates.
With respect to the former suggestion, he said that this was a matter 
relating to “operational information”, which the prosecution has a better 
understanding of, and also has a duty of confidence not to disclose.46 
With respect to the latter suggestion, he said it was not a realistic option 
as couriers may be “primed” by sophisticated syndicates with stories 
so as to appear to cooperate.47 While both responses by the Minister are 
not inherently unreasonable (but nor are they eminently unassailable 
as a matter of law or logic), it would seem then that ultimately, the 
Singapore government remains committed as ever (and democratically 
mandated) in its relentless war on illegal drugs and sees no need 
to recalibrate the state-versus-individual dichotomy for criminal 
44 It should be noted that it is also possible to seek a presidential pardon under the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Revised Edition 1985, 1999 Reprint), 
article 22P but successful cases have been extremely rare. In this regard, see Yong Vui 
Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189.
45 See also Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Edwin Tong): 
“By definition, an accused trafficker who satisfies the criteria in [section 33B] is likely 
to be a relatively low level transporter or assistant. That person is not likely to be in 
a position to give any substantive assistance especially if that assistance is to lead to 
some tangible disruption outcome … I wonder whether the threshold is not set too 
high. Such a requirement would likely disadvantage the offender who was sitting at 
the lower end of the hierarchy with little or no information on the senior members of 
the inner workings of the syndicate … It is possible that the assistance rendered or 
the information provided by the offender may either not be immediately or be fully 
appreciated. It is entirely possible that such information or assistance provided by 
the offender could be useless on its own but when put together with other pieces of 
information, obtained from other sources at other times, the fuller picture could well be 
very useful, and this may take several months or even years.”
46 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Kasiviswanathan 
Shanmugam). The Minister also added that, on the prior question of whether it should 
be the courts or prosecution that frames the charge, it should be the prosecution as its 
assessment will be based on intelligence not within the knowledge of the court; it is 
better placed to take note of broad public policy considerations; and it is often the case 
that an accused is willing to plead guilty, but will not do so if the charge carries the 
possibility of capital punishment, even if it is discretionary. 
47 Ibid.
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proceedings. The Minister for Law confirmed this as well during the 
debates by reminding the House in rather stark terms that: 
Let us be clear. [Couriers traffic]for money. They know what they are 
doing is wrong. They hide the drugs in secret compartments, all sorts 
of places, and try and traffic through our check points. 15 grams is not 
little. It is 2,200 straws – you can feed the addiction of 300 abusers for a 
week … The issue is not what we can do to help couriers avoid capital 
punishment. It is about what we can do to enhance the effectiveness 
of the [MDA] in a non-capricious and fair way without affecting our 
underlying fight against drugs.48
Not long after Chum Tat Suan (High Court) was decided, a judicial 
review application49 was filed regarding another section 33B case. In 
Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General,50 the accused 
sought a declaration that the prosecution had acted unconstitutionally 
and also in bad faith in not granting a certificate of substantive 
assistance under section 33B. Specifically, he argued that since his 
confederate in the very same drug trafficking enterprise was granted 
a certificate of substantive assistance based on information similar to 
what he had given to the CNB, there was unequal treatment in the 
constitutional sense; moreover, in light of the observations in Chum Tat 
Suan (High Court), the accused is always in a dilemma as to whether 
or not to give information to CNB or to deny liability. In any event, 
the prosecution had not conducted a proper and formal investigation in 
deciding whether substantive assistance had been rendered.51
As a starting point, the High Court essentially reiterated the now-
48 Ibid. See also Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Teo 
Chee Hean): “The policy intent of this substantive cooperation amendment to our 
mandatory death penalty regime is to maintain a tight regime – while giving ourselves 
an additional avenue to help us in our fight against drugs, and not to undermine it.” In 
fairness, the government did not redefine existing offences in the MDA either to make 
it easier to secure convictions, a fear that is often expressed by human rights advocates 
when discretion is injected into sentencing.
49 Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 619, [5]. Under 
Singapore law, three conditions must be fulfilled before leave for judicial review is 
granted. First, the subject matter must be susceptible to judicial review; secondly, the 
applicant must have sufficient interest or locus standi in the subject matter; and thirdly, 
the material before the court must disclose an arguable case or prima facie case of 
reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought. See also Vellama d/o 
Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1, [53].
50 Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2014] SGHC 179. 
51 Ibid, 20-23.
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established position that considerable deference should be accorded 
to the Attorney-General on prosecutorial decisions generally.52 
With specific regard to the facts of the case, the court dismissed the 
argument that the accused would, as a matter of course and without 
actual proof, be in a better position than his confederate to assist the 
CNB only because he claimed to be ranked higher in the drug syndicate 
hierarchy.53 The court also noted that whether an accused has rendered 
substantive assistance “is largely a value judgment which necessarily 
entails a certain degree of subjectivity [and] the court should be careful 
not to substitute its own judgment for the [prosecution’s] judgment.”54
Further, the court said that while the prosecution would consider 
factors such as the upstream and downstream effects of any information 
provided as well as its veracity when counterchecked against other 
intelligence sources, these are all extra-legal considerations best 
assessed by the prosecution. If the prosecution had to justify every 
certification decision in court every time allegations are made by 
accused persons, the operational effectiveness of the CNB will be 
hampered.55
Finally, as regards to the allegation about being deprived of ample 
opportunity to assist the CNB, the court held that no bad faith had 
arisen. It said that bad faith, in this context, is limited to the extraneous 
exercises of power, preconceived biases against the accused, or wholly 
arbitrary decisions.56 Not only had the accused failed to make out a 
prima facie case, the MDA “does not impose any legal duty on the 
part of the [prosecution] or the law enforcement agencies to expressly 
invite the accused to provide information [to the CNB]” and it is “in 
the accused’s best interests to provide information as early as possible 
during the course of the investigations.”57 All in all, any challenge of 
prosecutorial discretion by an accused – whether as regards prosecution 
52 Ibid, 41, 44, 72. 
53 Ibid, 47-48.
54 Ibid, 50.
55 Ibid, 50-51. This line of reasoning echoes the justifications used in national 
security matters, especially those involving indefinite detention.
56 Ibid, 57-61.
57 Ibid, 62-69. For completeness, it should be mentioned that this decision was 
preceded by another High Court decision regarding a similar challenge in Cheong 
Chun Yin v Attorney-General [2014] 3 SLR 1141. There, the accused had alleged 
that the leads regarding senior members of his drug syndicate that he had provided 
to CNB were not pursued and accordingly, the prosecutor’s decision not to award a 
certificate of substantive assistance could be quashed on the basis of the commission 
of a jurisdictional error of law. 
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generally,58 or the certification decision in the specific context of section 
33B of the MDA – will very unlikely result in success, not just from an 
evidential point of view but also in terms of the court’s unwillingness 
to interfere with what it considers to be a proper separation of powers, 
if not legitimate executive supremacy.59
Whether to sentence to death after the preconditions of section 33B 
are met
Finally, perhaps the most crucial matter that was not considered by 
Justice Choo in Chum Tat Suan (High Court) was whether the accused 
should nevertheless be sentenced to death even though he was found 
to be a courier. This is through no fault of the court of course, as the 
However, the court held that how the CNB and prosecution conduct its investigations 
in each case for the purposes of certification was simply not within the purview of 
the courts under the statutory scheme in section 33B of the MDA, and common 
law grounds of judicial review did not displace that. It should also be noted that in 
late-2014, new evidence emerged that gave the accused a chance at re-sentencing, 
so proceedings have not been concluded yet. While this development did raise the 
question of whether exonerating information that emerges after a drug courier has been 
hanged will dent public confidence in the new discretionary regime, this has more to 
do with the negative consequences of the death penalty generally rather than the new 
regime itself. This of course presupposes good faith on the part of the authorities.
58  Gary Chan, “Prosecutorial Discretion and the Legal Limits in Singapore,” 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 25(1) (2013): 15.
59 This may, of course, be a matter of characterisation. As stated by the Court of 
Appeal in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2014] SGCA 53, [6]–[7], the court 
“must disregard extra-legal considerations that are uniquely within the purview of the 
legislature … where the court does indeed have regard to extra-legal considerations, 
this must (in the nature of things) be by way of a very limited brief premised only on 
what is absolutely necessary to enable the court to apply the relevant legal principles 
… Drawing such a line in the legal sand is imperative. If this is not done, the court will 
necessarily be sucked into and thereby descend into the political arena, which would 
in turn undermine (or even destroy) the very role which constitutes the raison d’être 
for the court’s existence in the first place – namely, to furnish an independent, neutral 
and objective forum for deciding, on the basis of objective legal rules and principles, 
(inter alia) what rights parties have in a given situation” (emphasis in original). The 
court added (at [189]): “the court can only consider legal (as opposed to extra-legal) 
arguments. This ensures that it will not become a “mini legislature”. The court cannot – 
and must not – assume legislative functions which are necessarily beyond its limit. To 
do so would be to efface the very separation of powers which confers upon the court its 
legitimacy in the first place. If the court were to assume legislative functions, it would 
no longer be able to sit to assess the legality of statutes from an objective perspective. 
Worse still, it would necessarily be involved in expressing views on extra-legal issues 
which would … be … subjective in nature” (emphasis in original)”.
50 IIUM LAW JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1. 2015
legally subsequent questions of whether substantive assistance had been 
rendered to the CNB and whether the death penalty was appropriate 
in the circumstances were precluded from even being answered as 
the prosecution, had taken out a Criminal Reference to the Court of 
Appeal, seeking the apex court’s guidance on the observations about 
the evidential difficulties of the section 33B preconditions made by 
Justice Choo. Be that as it may, it may be helpful to parenthetically 
understand the contours of the dilemma of whether to sentence an 
accused to death even after he has satisfied the preconditions in section 
33B of the MDA before we consider the Court of Appeal’s observations 
in the Criminal Reference (since, by definition, the Criminal Reference 
does not answer the question of sentencing and the Court of Appeal 
would have to remit the matter back to the High Court for the sentence 
to be passed first, it is apposite to consider this issue in this section).
First of all, if one peruses the section again one notices that 
section 33B is completely silent as to what factors, considerations, 
or circumstances should be taken as mitigating or aggravating factors 
when deciding which is more appropriate, the death sentence or life 
imprisonment and caning is preferable.60 Whether or not some sort of 
sentencing parameters should have been codified was actually raised 
and debated in Parliament, but it was ultimately decided that it should 
be the courts, and not the legislature, that should develop the principles. 
In other words, section 33B was deliberately left bare  regarding the 
issue of sentencing considerations. The Minister for Law explained his 
position in the following terms:
While the courts will of course exercise any discretion in a principled 
and consistent manner, their view is that it is best that the legislature 
define in the clearest possible terms when the ultimate punishment 
is justified. That is the responsibility of the legislature, which is 
elected by the people … How would we craft the statute to give 
more discretion to the courts ... Can we conceive of a discretionary 
60 However, in Public Prosecutor v Purushothaman a/l Subramaniam [2014] SGHC 
231, the court held that under section 33B, life imprisonment is the only alternative 
custodial sentence to the death penalty; the only range applicable is the number of 
strokes of the cane. In relation to that, the court held that relevant factors would include 
the age of the offender, his motivation for trafficking, whether he was a repeat offender, 
whether there was cooperation with the authorities, and whether there were aggravating 
factors. The parliamentary debates do not yield a clear answer either. Section 33B of 
the MDA may also be contrasted with section 304 of the Penal Code concerning the 
discretionary death penalty for certain culpable homicide offences, in which the latter 
is much clearer in stating life imprisonment as the only possible sentence.
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sentencing approach which maintains the deterrent value of the death 
penalty across the whole spectrum of drug trafficking activities? With 
the best of intentions, it will be difficult – I think it is impossible. 
That is the view which we came to after discussing and considering 
the matter carefully, with the agencies, with the various Attorneys-
General, and with the courts. Consider what factors you will set out 
for exercise of discretion: would you say age, youth? Would you say 
young mothers? Would you say impecuniosity? Would you say, see if 
the trafficker was baited with love? Or would you look at other family 
circumstances? You set out the criteria, whatever they are, and the 
drug lords will send you any number who will satisfy those criteria, 
who will perfectly fit the profile. This is because you are looking 
at background factors; the circumstances of the crime become less 
important … You go down this route – in effect you might have a de 
facto abolition of the death penalty.61
Thus, Parliament’s main motivation in refusing to state the guidelines 
was to preserve the deterrent effect of the MDA. On a separate line 
of thinking, it may also be said that leaving the matter unlegislated is 
a (long-awaited) triumph for judicial sovereignty and the separation 
of powers, as sentencing should always be within the domain of the 
courts.62 However, it ought to be borne in mind that:
Just as rules may cause arbitrariness in that legislative classifications 
adopted to formulate rules are inevitably arbitrary to some degree, a 
regime of discretion is also subject to criticism in that the exercise 
of discretion may well produce arbitrariness as well. One judge may 
61 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Kasiviswanathan 
Shanmugam). One also needs to understand the nature of law reform in Singapore. In 
recent years, the Ministry of Law has taken a more proactive role in making changes 
to or initiating new legislation. Stakeholders – other governmental agencies, lawyers, 
and academics – are consulted, and sometimes a report is generated before the bill is 
debated in Parliament. So one would have thought that scaling back on the mandatory 
death penalty would have induced a lot of debate in Parliament, but this was not the 
case. When the discretionary death penalty was introduced for certain types of murder 
offences for instance, only five (or around 5% of the total number of Members of 
Parliament) had anything to say about it: Second Reading of Penal Code (Amendment) 
Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012.
62 Mohan and Chia, “The Death Penalty and the Desirability of Judicial Discretion”. 
See also Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947, [43]–
[45], where the Court of Appeal held that the power to enact offences and to prescribe 
the corresponding punishments was a legislative power and not a judicial one; the 
duty of the courts is to inflict the legislatively prescribed punishments, exercising such 
discretion as might have been given to them by the legislature to select the punishments 
which they think appropriate. 
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give rather more weight a mitigating factor than another, resulting in 
the death penalty for one offender and not for another, although both 
offenders are similarly situated. And if the courts try to prevent this 
kind of arbitrariness, they will have to fashion “guidelines” which, if 
enforced consistently, will morph into de facto rules.63
It seems, then, that the two most plausible outcomes emerging from 
the lack of sentencing guidance in section 33B are that first, the courts 
themselves would have to develop some kind of clear guidelines so 
as to achieve an acceptable level of sentencing consistency, perhaps 
similar to the way the common law incrementally creates principles 
concerning mitigating and aggravating factors. This is imperative as 
“the presence of inconsistency in sentencing diminishes the idea of 
justice being equal to all in a legal system … leads to public cynicism 
… and eventually, to the loss of public confidence in the administration 
of justice.”64 In this regard, the Singapore courts have recently 
emphasised the importance of sentencing benchmarks in certain types 
of crimes, presumably in furtherance of this ideal of consistency (and 
concomitantly clear)65 – which is surely a tenet of any conception of the 
rule of law, though it must be recognised that the perennial and endemic 
63 Hor, “The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law,” 112. For a 
commentary on the suggested sentencing guidelines certain types of murder offences 
(of which, as mentioned, the discretionary death penalty now also applies, and of 
which, the corresponding statute is also silent on sentencing considerations), see 
Mohan and Chia, “The Death Penalty and the Desirability of Judicial Discretion”. For a 
commentary on how the legislative decision not to regulate judicial prerogatives (such 
as inherent powers), albeit again in a separate context, this time in that of evidence 
law, see Chen Siyuan, “The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act: More 
Questions than Answers as Regards Expert Opinion Evidence?” Statute Law Review 
34(3) (2013): 262; Chen Siyuan, “The Future of the Similar Rule in an Indian Evidence 
Act Jurisdiction: Singapore,” National University of Juridical Sciences Law Review 
6(3) (2013): 361.
64 Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500, [19].
65 See for instance Edwin s/o Suse Nathan v Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 SLR 1139 
(drink driving) and Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] SGHC 171 (causing death by 
a negligent act). In a speech at the 2014 Sentencing Conference (Singapore Academy 
of Law), Chief Justice of Singapore, Sundaresh Menon, outlined the following pillars 
of sentencing: first, identify the purpose of the penal legislation; second, explore the 
full spectrum of prescribed options and identify the one that is most proportionate on 
the facts; third, like cases should be treated alike; fourth, consider the characteristics 
of the offender and circumstances of the offence; fifth, consider alternative sentences 
where applicable; and fifth, judges should give proper reasons in their decisions (facts, 
mitigating factors, and aggravating factors) so that their exercise of discretion is 
justified. 
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tension between the principles of consistency and individualised justice 
will never go away.66
But an equally plausible outcome that may well materialise at the 
same time is that there may be a de facto abolition of the death penalty 
for drug couriers (assuming they also satisfy the substantive assistance 
requirement), if the death penalty is going to end up being rarely 
invoked. Even the Minister for Law noted in the parliamentary debates 
that when there are sentencing options to choose from, judges tend not 
to go for the maximum, unless there are exceptional circumstances, 
such as when the offence was committed in a particularly egregious 
manner.67 Indeed, if the judge actually seeks submissions on sentencing, 
it is difficult to see how the prosecution can still recommend the death 
penalty if the prosecution had already confirmed and certified substantive 
assistance.68 Fact-sensitive justice in the context of avoidable capital 
punishment is thus likely to take on a different meaning. Combining 
the two outcomes, it seems a matter of time before the death penalty is 
phased out, at least for drug couriers on account of their presumptive 
lower moral culpability. Yet this is precisely what Parliament did not 
intend as a natural consequence.69
There is of course a third possible outcome: that a trend emerges 
whereby the prosecution withholds from charging the accused with 
an offence (by increasing or decreasing the quantity of drugs that the 
accused allegedly trafficked) that may lead to the death penalty to 
begin with, if it seems that the accused did not have that high a level 
of moral culpability.70 However, even if a downward trend of capital 
Chief Justice of Western Australia Wayne Martin, featuring as guest speaker at the same 
conference, suggested that the art of sentencing involves identifying what is reasonably 
proportionate and balancing contradictory and incommensurable objectives.
66 In the same way that the debate as to whether sentencing is an art or science will 
never go away.
67 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill (Kasiviswanathan 
Shanmugam). See also Sia Ah Kew v Public Prosecutor [1974–1976] SLR(R) 54, [5].
68 If so, this is yet another cession of power from the judiciary to the executive, in 
the sense that the prosecution is in effect deciding whether a death penalty is warranted 
at two stages: first, when the charge is framed; and secondly, when deciding on whether 
substantive assistance has been provided.
69 The point about a mandatory purposive interpretation of all statutory provisions 
in Singapore has already been made earlier. Another potential conflict is that generally, 
the importance of retribution and deterrence as sentencing principles has been on the 
wane for some time already.
70 Peggy Pao-Keerthi, “Looking Beyond Prospective Guidance: Sentencing 
Discretion in Capital Drug Framework and Lessons from the US,” Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 26(2) (2014): 529–530. 
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drug charges emerges, one will imagine this may change if there is 
evidence of an increasing number of drug abusers or the drug trafficking 
situation getting out of hand.71 But to return to the matter of judicial 
discretion, leaving it to the courts to develop sentencing considerations 
will inevitably mean that the jurisprudence will take some time 
to crystallise.72 The multiple downsides of developing sentencing 
guidelines incrementally via case law were also recognised by Judge 
of Appeal Justice Chao in the recent 2014 Sentencing Conference 
organised by the Singapore Academy of Law, and of particular note 
is that insofar as the adversarial system is preserved in the criminal 
justice system, the quality of jurisprudential guidelines will depend in 
no small part on the quality of the criminal defence bar. 
One imagines too that Criminal References (and Criminal Motions 
by necessity) will continue to be filed as the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers seek further clarifications on issues of law from the Court of 
Appeal as and when such a need arises. Certainly the Singapore courts 
appear to welcome this new dynamic in the criminal justice system. 
But all of this has important implications for the accused, who is forced 
to wait indefinitely to learn of his fate. Efficient as Singapore courts 
are (and they are already one of the fastest in the world), such waiting 
can still last for a number of years, especially if application is filed 
after application. Providing a set of factors – not fixed criteria – for 
consideration in the legislation would have helped prevent this, or at 
the very least, given some consistency and clarity from the outset.73
Although the courts have the power to amend charges, this is somehow not done that 
often in capital drug cases. It should also be noted that based on modern practices of the 
Attorney-General’s Chambers, capital drug trafficking cases are internally reviewed 
on several levels before charging decisions are made. Presumably, the substantive 
certification process will also be subject to these multi-level internal reviews.
71 “Drug Situation Report 2013,” Central Narcotics Bureau, accessed  December 
1, 2014 http://www.cnb.gov.sg/drugsituationreport/drugsituationreport2013.aspx. 
Although the court has the power to amend the charge at any time, it does not exercise 
this power consistently. 
72 To be clear, there have thus far been a few cases that have re-sentenced accused 
persons pursuant to section 33B, but written grounds of decision have generally not 
been forthcoming: Pao, “Looking Beyond Prospective Guidance”, 536–539. One 
exception is Abdul Haleem bin Abdul Karim,[58], which considered factors such as 
whether there were antecedents, the motivation behind committing the offence, and the 
exact role of the accused notwithstanding his characterisation as a courier.  
73 For a differing account see Pao, “Looking Beyond Prospective Guidance”, 
520. There, the author surveyed the established jurisprudence in the US, noting that 
“weaknesses of death penalty sentencing statutes in the US – that they contain long 
lists of broad or vague aggravating factors; that catch-all phrases are used; 
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In this regard, though the governing legislation and sentencing 
options are admittedly different from Singapore’s, it is interesting to 
note that in England and Wales, the Sentencing Council has made a 
number of specific recommendations when the accused in a drug 
trafficking offence is a non-professional mule; for instance, if a mule 
was acting out of need and naivety rather than greed, this is likely to 
result in less severe punishment.74 The absence of statutory guidelines 
and a full-fledged sentencing council in Singapore75 may thus prompt 
the courts to look at the practices of other jurisdictions, but this may 
be a challenge in so far as most of the developed jurisdictions no 
longer have the death penalty, discretionary or otherwise. It seems, the 
Singapore courts will be expected to give particularly clear and cogent 
reasons and principles in their sentencing decisions where section 33B 
of the MDA is concerned. That way, the Court of Appeal will also have 
a better picture as to whether the sentence imposed is appropriate if 
there is an appeal.76
and that little or no guidance is given to sentencers on how to weigh the various 
aggravating and mitigating factors – are not symptoms of incompetent drafters or 
poor doctrinal choices. Rather, they are indicative of the ineluctable trade-off between 
the need for consistency and the imperative of doing justice in the individual case.” 
Accordingly, she rejects the notion of prospective guidance and instead advocates “the 
organic and incremental development of principles through the accumulation of cases 
... However, in order to ensure the development of rational and holistic principles, the 
court’s sentencing reasoning … should be properly captured.”
74 March 2011, “Drug Offences Guideline,” Sentencing Council March 2011, 
accessed  December 1,2014 http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Drug_
Offences_Guideline_Professional_Consultation.pdf. The Sentencing Council is an 
independent, non-departmental public body of the Ministry of Justice and is responsible 
for developing sentencing guidelines and monitoring their use. Elsewhere, the 
legislature in New Zealand is involved in the development of the guidelines, while in 
the USA, guidelines are very detailed and cater to many different factual possibilities. 
Perhaps a little too innovatively, China has even experimented with computer-aided 
sentencing. This idea of computerised sentencing was not only alluded to by Justice 
Chan Seng Onn at the 2014 Sentencing Conference, but also recommended for adoption.
75 The Supreme Court does have a Sentencing Council and a sentencing database, 
but their scope is limited to consistency of sentencing in the State Courts for now. 
Recently introduced as well are specially convened, three-judge panels to hear complex 
appeals for criminal cases emanating from the State Courts – such appeals are usually 
heard by a single judge.
76 Tan Koon Swan v Public Prosecutor [1985–1986] SLR(R) 976, [3]–[9]. 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Pulling all the threads together, the following four observations can be 
made:
(a) Although the 2012 amendments to the MDA may be motivated 
by a desire to recalibrate the appropriate culpability attached 
to drug couriers, it was clearly not meant to compromise 
in any way the effectiveness of the robust anti-drug regime 
in Singapore. This, in turn, informs any analysis of the 
amendments’ implications as regards the rights of, and impacts 
on, the accused. It is important not to mistakenly think that 
the purpose of the amendments is to show greater compassion 
to lowly ranked members of drug syndicates, or that there is 
any diminution in the belief that the death penalty works as an 
effective deterrent against drug trafficking. If anything, it may 
be said that the purpose of the amendments is served by the 
prospect of couriers taking the bait to avoid mandatory death 
and “ratting” on higher-ups in the drug syndicate in return. In 
this connection, it should be borne in mind that in Singapore, 
the purposive approach dislodges all other canons of statutory 
interpretation.
(b) It is difficult to see how a drug courier can hope to successfully 
avail himself of section 33B of the MDA if he does not first 
confess to liability and pleads guilty to the drug trafficking charge. 
If he keeps quiet or changes tack only later on, this is unlikely to 
work in his favour and indeed may be held against him in a very 
real sense. The Singapore government seems to take the view 
that the derogation from his privilege against self-incrimination 
and the right to a presumption of innocence is the appropriate 
trade-off for a possible avoidance of mandatory death. This is 
According to the Court of Criminal Appeal in that case, there are four established 
grounds as to when an appellate court can interfere with a sentencing decision: if the 
sentencing judge has made a wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for the 
sentence; there has been an error on the part of the sentencing judge in appreciating 
the material placed before him; the sentence was wrong in principle; or the sentenced 
imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate. See also CPC, section 394: “Any 
judgment, sentence or order of a trial court may be reversed or set aside only where the 
appellate court is satisfied that it was wrong in law or against the weight of evidence 
or, in the case of a sentence, manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate in all the 
circumstances of the case.”
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consistent with the principal aim of the amendments and also the 
general tenor of the criminal justice system in Singapore. So long 
as the government retains the longstanding democratic mandate 
of the people, the prioritisation of crime control is legitimised 
parochially. One may, of course, maintain that if an accused is 
indeed innocent, his right to a presumption of innocence (whether 
manifested in the form of the privilege against self-incrimination 
or otherwise) is unaffected by the amendments from an evidential 
point of view. However, one also cannot rule out the possibility 
that an innocent accused may be induced to confess and avoid 
death rather than take the chance of being wrongfully convicted. 
This possibility may seem remote in a generally corrupt-free 
Singapore, but a criminal justice system should guard against all 
eventualities to whatever extent feasible. 
(c) Both Parliament and the courts (at least thus far) have decided 
that the prosecution is in a far better position (than the court) to 
assess the question of whether substantive assistance has been 
provided to the CNB in disrupting drug trafficking activities 
within or outside Singapore, mainly on the basis that the 
assessment of such a question would involve the weighing of 
many extra-legal considerations that are (or should be) outside 
the purview of the courts. Further, although the MDA allows 
the certification decision to be challenged on the grounds 
of bad faith or malice, it seems almost impossible for any 
accused to prove this given the jurisprudential presumption of 
propriety afforded to the Attorney-General. The tilt in favour 
of executive supremacy, and acceptance of parliamentary 
legitimacy, is strongest here. However, as it were, a lot of 
power and responsibility is already given to the prosecution 
as regards the prosecutorial process generally. Perhaps the 
conundrum that arises from creating additional powers for 
the prosecution regarding the certification process may be 
resolved by having the prosecution (or even the court) amend 
the charge so that it no longer triggers the death penalty, but 
this will result in section 33B being a legislative amendment 
in vain. Another complication is that the range of punishments 
may differ depending on the type of drugs trafficked.77 
 
 
77 MDA, Schedule 2.
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(d) Even if substantive assistance has been certified, there still 
remains the question of whether the death penalty should be 
meted out. Section 33B of the MDA is completely silent on 
this, and this was a deliberate move on the part of Parliament 
as the preference was for the courts to incrementally develop 
sentencing guidelines on their own terms. Again, this was 
meant to preserve the deterrent effect of the MDA more than 
anything else (as opposed to restoring judicial prerogative). 
However, without pre-existing guidelines, it is likely that the 
courts will reserve the death penalty only for the most egregious 
types of drug couriers, and the de facto abolition of the death 
penalty (for drug couriers at least) will accordingly eventuate, 
which is contrary to what Parliament intended. After all, it is 
unlikely that the prosecution will certify substantial assistance 
if circumstances suggest that the accused is far from an 
exploited vulnerable. Separately, without the benefit of relevant 
comparative experience, the only way in which the Singapore 
courts can achieve sentencing consistency and individualised 
justice in future section 33B cases is to give particularly clear 
and cogent reasons and principles in every decision that is 
rendered. This is not a task beyond the judiciary of course, but 
it will definitely mean that sentences take longer to pass and 
the jurisprudence takes longer to cohere. This always has a toll 
on people on death row.
The accused in Chum Tat Suan (High Court) is but one of many awaiting 
their fates, as it is believed that there are some 20-odd accused persons 
originally sentenced to death for drug trafficking who are eligible 
for re-sentencing by virtue of the MDA’s transitional provisions.78 
The Court of Appeal’s impending observations in the Criminal 
Reference filed will certainly be examined closely in the months to 
come, and it is hoped that this article will provide an additional view 
78 Pao, “Looking Beyond Prospective Guidance”, 535; Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Singapore), “Statement by MHA in Response to Media Queries Regarding Capital 
Punishment”, accessed December 1, 2014. http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.
aspx?nid=MzIxMg%3D%3D-JKr4CnFh6eQ%3D.. Interestingly, between 2010 and 
2012, there were only two executions for drugs-related offences: Singapore Prison 
Service, “Greater Community Involvement Contributes to Lower Re-offending Rates”, 
accessed December 1, 2014 http://www.prisons.gov.sg/content/dam/sps/publication_
latest/2013%20Singapore%20Prison%20Service%20Annual%20Statistics%20
Release.pdf.
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as to the possible issues that arise out of the amended MDA provisions. 
To the extent that there are also other jurisdictions with similar drug 
legislation and the mandatory death penalty, or that may have plans 
to introduce a discretionary death penalty regime, the Singapore 
experience may even be of comparative value.
